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Abstract. In medical emergencies, an instant and secure messaging is an im-
portant service to provide quality healthcare services. A session initiation proto-
col (SIP) is an IP-based multimedia and telephony communication protocol used
to provide instant messaging services. Thus, design of secure and efficient SIP
for quality medical services is an emerging problem. In this paper, we first ex-
plore the security limitations of the existing SIPs proposed by Sureshkumar et
al. and Zhang et al. in the literature. Our analysis shows that most of the exist-
ing schemes fail to protect the user credentials when unexpectedly the session-
specific ephemeral secrets revealed to an adversary by the session exposure at-
tacks. We then present a possible improvement over Sureshkumar et al.’s scheme
without increasing the computational cost. We compare the proposed improve-
ment for computational overheads and security features with the various related
existing schemes in the literature.
Keywords: Security, Privacy, Session Initiation Protocol, Authentication, Emer-
gency healthcare
1 Introduction
With the recent advances in the mobile healthcare applications, demand for secure SIP
for emergency messaging alert is dramatically increasing. The e-health services present
one of the major societal and economic challenges around the world, particularly for
the aging society. Due to rapid growth in the number of aged people who are suffering
from chronic diseases, it is emerging to improve the fast and quality low cost health-
care services. As a result, a primary focus is shifted towards delivering real-time health
monitoring and quality healthcare services to the patients from their respective localities
in a secure and efficient way, particularly in the medical emergency [1]. In emergency
medical services (EMS), system can send an emergency request when a patient is in a
critical situation. There are several EMS available where the emergency request (instant
message)/ multimedia services (transmission of voice and video calls) can be sent via
the cellular networks (4G/LTE,3G) [2], [3].
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In the last couple of years, Voice-over-IP (VoIP) has been used mostly for multime-
dia data communication. The VoIP facilitates to make calls over the standard Internet
broadband connection instead of public switched telephone network [4], [5], [6]. On the
other hand, SIP is typically used for IP-based telephony authentication, which is robust
and superior over VoIP for instant messaging, internet telephone calls as well as Internet
multimedia messages. SIP is used for multimedia data communications in 4G/LTE or
3G mobile networks by the 3GPP (3G Partnership Project) [7]. Primarily, SIP has been
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force standard for IP telephony [8]. SIP
is a client/server based authentication scheme and it works based on digest access au-
thentication protocol for HTTP (Hyper Text Transport Protocol) [9]. In the healthcare
system, when a patient wants to send an emergency request, he/she has to perform the
authentication process with remote server for secure communication. According to Sal-
sano et al. [10] and Keromytis et al. [11], it is quite facile for a malicious/unauthorized
user to raise a spam call or send a manipulated message to the server. If an adversary
can eavesdrop, intercept or modify the emergency request, it can be catastrophic for a
patient.
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Fig. 1. Proposed architecture for IoT based patient monitoring System.
We consider a network scenario as shown in Figure 1. In this model, mobile care
unit (MCU) collect the information from the body sensors of patient. MCU is responsi-
ble to monitor the patient’s health data and send the emergency request to the hospital
server through a cellular network. Since the health data and resources are valuable in
the emergency medical situations, the hospital server (authentication server) must en-
sure the validity of the received request. Therefore, ensure security while maintaining
efficiency is one of the important concern in SIP for healthcare applications. In this
paper, we consider the widely accepted Canetti-Krawczyk adversary (CK-adversary)
model [12] to analyze the existing SIP. According to CK-adversary model, an authenti-
cation protocol should satisfy the following two security properties [13], [14].
– Future sessions should secure even if a session-specific ephemeral secrets are un-
expectedly revealed to an adversary through session exposure attack.
– All past sessions should secure even if the long-term keys of some/all the users as
well as server compromise to an adversary.
In addition, the user secret credentials should be protected against an adversary, that is,
even session-specific ephemeral revealed to an adversary, he/she cannot derive the user
secret credentials such identity and password.
1.1 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the re-
quired mathematical preliminaries to review and analyze the security pitfall of the ex-
isting schemes. In Section 3, we discuss the related work. In Sections 4 & 5, we review
and analyze the security weakness of the existing schemes. We then discuss the possible
improvement in Section 6. The performance analysis is presented in Section 7. Finally,
we discuss the conclusion and future work in Section 8.
2 Mathematical preliminaries
A non-singular elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b over the finite field GF (q) is the set
Eq of solutions (x, y) ∈ Zq ×Zq to the congruence y2 = x3 + ax+ b (mod q), where
a, b ∈ Zq are constants such that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (mod q), along with the point at
infinity or zero point, denoted by O, Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} and q > 3 be a prime.
The set of elliptic curve points Eq forms an abelian group under addition modulo q
operation [15].
Let P be a base point on Eq(a, b) and generates a cyclic group G, whose order is n,
that is, nP = P + P + . . .+ P ( times) = O.
The elliptic curve point multiplication is defined as the repeated additions. For ex-
ample, if P ∈ Eq(a, b), then 5P is computed as 5P = P + P + P + P + P (mod q).
Definition 1. Computing Q = kP is relatively easy for given k ∈ Zq and P ∈ G.
But, computing scalar k for given P and Q = kP is computationally difficult problem,
known as elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP)). Given the parame-
ters P, xP, yP ∈ G, computing the value xyP ∈ G is computationally hard without
the knowledge of either x ∈ Z∗q or y ∈ Z∗q , where Z∗q = {a|0 < a < q, gcd(a, q) = 1}
= {1, 2, 3, . . . , q − 1}.
Definition 3 (Collision-resistant one-way hash function). A collision-resistant one-
way hash function h : X → Y , where X = {0, 1}∗ and Y = {0, 1}n, is considered
as a deterministic algorithm which takes arbitrary length input binary x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
outputs a fixed length binary string y ∈ {0, 1}n of length n [16], [17].
3 Related Work
An authentication scheme should provide various aspects of security features for the
SIP-based secure messaging system. The aim of an authentication protocol facilitate
to the client and server to mutually authenticate each other and share a session key to
communicate securely over the public channel. In 1999, Franks et al. [9] derived the
original SIP authentication scheme from HTTP digest authentication. Later, Yang et al.
[18] found the limitations of Franks et al. [9] that it fails achieve the off-line password
guessing attack, server-spoofing attack, and Yang et al. [18] then proposed a new au-
thentication scheme for SIP. In 2015, Zhang et al. [19] presented an SIP authentication
approach using ECC, and they claimed that their scheme satisfies all the required secu-
rity features. However, Lu et al. [20] and Tu et al. [21] proved that the Zhang et al.’s
proposed scheme [19] is suffering from insider attack, impersonation attack, and failed
to achieve strong mutual authentication. Further, Tu et al. presented an enhancement Tu
et al. [21] over the Zhang et al.’s scheme. Lu et al. [20] also proposed an ECC base effi-
cient SIP with less computation cost. However, both Farash [7] and Chaudhry et al. [22]
analyzed and shown that Tu et al.’s scheme [21] still have security pitfalls as it failed to
provide the user anonymity as well as insecure against impersonation attack. Farash [7]
further proposed an improved SIP, and simultaneously, Chaudhry et al. also proposed
an improved SIP [22]. In the recent, Lu et al. [23] and Chaudhry et al. [22] indepen-
dently analyzed and showed that Farash’s scheme [7] is insecure against replay attack
and impersonate attack, and failed to provide the user anonymity. Further they presented
the improved versions to overcome the drawback. Recently, in 2017, Sureshkumar et
al. [26] proposed an enhanced authentication scheme for SIP by pointing out the lim-
itations in Lu et al. [20] and shown that it does not provide user anonymity, and the
capability to resist user and server impersonation attacks. In this paper, we analyze and
explore the security limitations of Zhang et al. [19] and Sureshkumar et al. [26]. Our
proposed security analysis is also applicable to the most of existing schemes in the lit-
erature, particularly we consider the related existing SIPs in the literature proposed by
Lu et al. [20], Tu et al. [21], Farash [7], Chaudhry et al. [22], and Lu et al. [23]. We
then propose a possible improvement to withstand the drawback find in the existing
schemes, and discuss the future work.
Table 1. Notations used in this paper
U & S User & Server
IDu and pwu Chosen identity and password of U
Eq(a, b) & P Elliptic curve defined over finite field Zq & P a base point on Eq(a, b)
kP Point multiplication in Eq(a, b), where k ∈ Z∗q
ks & Qs Master private key & Public key of S, respectively, where Qs = ksP
h(·) A collusion-resistant one-way hash function
tx Current timestamp generated by entity X ∈ {U, S}
|| and ⊕ Concatenation and Bit-wise XOR operation, respectively
4 Review and analysis of Sureshkumar et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we briefly review Sureshkumar et al. [26] proposed SIP and then present
a security analysis. Sureshkumar et al. scheme consist of three phases, namely, system
initialization, registration and authentication phases. The briefly review the three phases
of Sureshkumar et al. scheme below. Note that hereafter we use the notations listed in
Table 1.
Three phases of Sureshkumar et al.’s scheme
Initialization phase
Select elliptic curve Eq(a, b) and base point P
Selects secure one-way hash function h(·)
Selects master private key ks and compute public key Qs = ksP
Declares publicly {Eq(a, b), q, P,Qs, h(·)}
User registration phase
User U Server S
Choose IDu,pwu
Computes HIPu = h(IDu||pwu), HIDu = h(IDu),
RPu = IDu ⊕ pwu
Reg={HIDu,HIPu,RPu}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Private channel
Computes UPWu = h(HIDu||ks)⊕HIPu
Stores {UPWu, RPu} in the database against HIDu.
Login and key establishment phase
User U Server S
Chooses ru ∈ Z∗q
Computes Ru = ruP , Ku = ruQs,
HIDu = h(IDu), HIPu = h(IDu||pwu),
Du = HIDu ⊕ h(Ku), Authu = h(HIPu||Ku||tu)
m1={Ru,Du,Authu,tu}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Public channel
Checks validity of tu. Accept/Reject.
Computes Ks = ksRu, HIDu = Du ⊕ h(Ks)
HIP ′u = UPWu ⊕h(HIDu||ks)
Checks Authu =? h(HIP ′u||Ks||tu). Accept/Reject.
Selects rs ∈ Z∗q
Computes Rs = rsP , DKs = rsRu
Auths = h(HIP
′
u||Rs||DKs||ts)
SKs = h(Ks||DKs||HIP ′u)
m2={Rs,Auths,ts}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Public channel
Checks validity of ts. Accept/Reject.
Computes DKu = ruRs
Checks Auths =? h(HIPu||Rs||DKu||ts). Accept/Reject.
Computes SKu = h(Ku||DKu||HIPu),
Conf = h(Authu||Auths||SKu)
m3={Conf}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Public channel
Checks Conf =? h(Authu||Auths||SKs). Accept/Reject.
Security Analysis
In the following, we describe the security drawbacks of Sureshkumar et al.’s proposed scheme.
Assume that an adversary captures all the transmitted messages between user U and server S
via a public channel. The list of transcripts of each session are {m1,m2,m3}, where m1 =
{Ru, Du, Authu, tu}, m2 = {Rs, Auths, ts}, and m3 = {Conf}. Now we assume that the
adversary launch session exposure attacks and get the session random secret ru ∈ Z∗q [12]. The
adversary A computes the user credentials IDu and pwu as follows using the revealed session
ephemeral ru of user U:
– Computes R∗u = ruP . Checks whether R∗u matches with the parameter Ru from m1.
– If it matches, it guess the identity IDu as follows. Otherwise, repeat search for matching
Ru.
• Compute Ku = ruQs and HIDu = Du ⊕ h(Ku) = h(IDu).
• Guess an identity ID∗u and checks the validity of HIDu = h(ID∗u). If valid guessed
identity ID∗u is the original identity IDu.
• Otherwise, repeat guessing until match. Since identity is chosen by user, off-line guess-
ing of identity is not hard [26].
Next adversary A launch the off-line password guessing attack as follows:
– Guess a password pw∗u.
– Check the validity of Authu = h(h(IDu||pw∗u)||Ku||tu). If it is valid, the guessed pass-
word is valid, that is, pw∗u is pwu.
– Otherwise, repeat the guessing until the match.
Therefore, from the above analysis, it is clear that Sureshkumar et al.’s proposed SIP fails to
provide the user credentials privacy when the session-ephemeral secrets unexpectedly revealed to
the adversary.
5 Review and analysis of Zhang et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we review and present the security analysis on Zhang et al.’s [19], and shows that
their scheme also fail to protect the user credentials under CK-adversary assumption. Zhang et
al.’s scheme consist three phases such as initialization, registration, and authentication phases.
The initialization phase of Zhang et al.’s scheme is same as in Sureshkumar et al.’s scheme [26].
The other two phases registration and authentication of Zhang et al.’s scheme are as follows. Note
that user’s realm is used to prompt the user identity and password.
User registration phase
User U Server S
Chooses IDu, pwu
{IDu,pwu}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Private channel
V PWu=h(IDu||ks)⊕h(IDu||pwu)
Stores {IDu, V PWu} in the database
Login and key establishment phase
User U Server S
Chooses ru ∈ Z∗q ,
Computes Ru = ruP , Ku = ruQs,
HIDu = IDu ⊕ h(Ru||Ku),
m1={HIDu,Ru}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Public channel
Chooses rs ∈ Z∗q ,
Computes Rs = rsP , Ks = ksRu, DKs = rsRu,
Auths = h(Ks||DKs||Rs||Ru)
m2={realm,Rs,Auths}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Public channel
Computes SKu = abP
Check Auths =? h(Ku||DKu||Rs||Ru). Accept/Reject.
Computes SK = h(IDu||DKu||Ku||Ru||Rs),
Authu = h(realm||Ku||DKu||Rs||Ru||h(IDu||pwu))
m3={realm,Authu}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Public channel
Computes ID′u = HIDu ⊕ h(Ru||Ks)
h(IDu||pwu) = V PWu ⊕ h(ID′u||ks)
Checks Authu =? h(realm||Ks||DKs||Rs||Ru
||h(IDu||pwu)). Accept/Reject.
Computes SK = h(IDu||DKs||Ks||Ru||Rs)
Security Analysis
We assume that an adversary captures all the transmitted messages between user U and server
S via a public channel. The captured messages are {m1,m2,m3}, where m1 = {HIDu, Ru}
, M2 = {realm,Rs, Auths}, and m3 = {realm,Authu}. As defined, suppose the session
ephemeral secret ru ∈ Z∗q unexpectedly revealed to the adversary by the session exposure attacks
[12]. Then the adversary A can compute the user credentials as follows:
– Computes R∗u = ruP and K∗u = ruQs.
– Checks whether R∗u matches with the parameter Ru presented in m1.
– If match found, Ru = R∗u and Ku = K∗u of user U with identity IDu.
– Computes user identity IDu = HIDu ⊕ h(Ru||Ku). Then adversary launches off-line
password guessing attack as follows.
• Computes DKu = ruRs.
• Guess password pw∗u.
• Checks the validity of Authu = h(realm||Ku||DKu||Rs||Ru||h(IDu||pw∗u)).
• If it is valid, the guessed password pw∗u is original password pwu. Otherwise, repeat the
guessing until find the match.
From the above analysis, it is clear that Zhang et al.’s scheme fails to protect the user secret
credentials (IDu, pwu) when the session ephemeral secrets revealed to the adversary.
6 Proposed Enhancement
In this section, we propose an improvement over the Sureshkumar et al.’s scheme [26]. Our small
modification in the storing parameters in the server database and small variation in the login re-
quest message, make the enhanced protocol is secure against the defined adversary. Our improved
also have three phases, namely initialization, registration and authentication phases. The regis-
tration phase is same as in Sureshkumar et al.’s scheme [26], and the other phases are presented
below.
User registration phase
User U Server S
Choose IDu,pwu
Computes HIPu = h(IDu||pwu), HIDu = h(IDu),
Reg={HIDu,HIPu}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Private channel
Choose a random number au ∈ Z∗q
Computes UPWu = HIDu ⊕ h(ks||au)⊕HIPu
Stores {UPWu, au} in the database against h(HIPu||1).
Login and key establishment phase
User U Server S
Chooses ru ∈ Z∗q
Computes Ru = ruP , Ku = ruQs,
HIPu = h(IDu||pwu),
DPu = HIPu ⊕ h(Ku), Authu = h(HIPu||Ku||tu)
m1={Ru,DPu,Authu,tu}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Public channel
Checks validity of tu. Accept/Reject.
Computes Ks = ksRu, HIP ′u = DPu ⊕ h(Ks)
Checks Authu =? h(HIP ′u||Ks||tu). Accept/Reject.
Retrieve UPWu which is stored against h(HIP ′u||1)
Chooses rs ∈ Z∗q
Computes Rs = rsP , DKs = rsRu
HID′u = UPWu ⊕h(ks||au)⊕HIP ′u
Auths = h(HID
′
u||HIP ′u||Rs||DKs||ts)
SKs = h(Ks||DKs||HIP ′u||HID′u)
m2={Rs,Auths,ts}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Public channel
Checks validity of ts. Accept/Reject.
Computes DKu = ruRs
Checks Auths =? h(HIDu||HIPu||Rs||DKu||ts). Accept/Reject.
Computes SKu = h(Ku||DKu||HIPu||HIDu),
Conf = h(Authu||Auths||SKu||tu||ts)
m3={Conf}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Public channel
Checks Conf =? h(Authu||Auths||SKs||tu||ts). Accept/Reject.
Security Analysis
In our improved version of the protocol, we updated the server database table as h(HIPu||1) :
{UPWu, au} for userU . We then modified the request message asm1 = {Ru, DPu, Authu, tu}.
In our scheme, we are sendingDPu = HIPu⊕h(Ku) instead of sendingDu = HIDu⊕h(Ku)
in the Sureshkumar et al.’s scheme [26]. In our case, even if the session ephemeral secret revealed
to an adversary A, he/she can only retrieve HIPu = h(IDu||pwu). Therefore, guessing both
identity IDu and password pwu simultaneously makes hard to the adversary than guessing one-
by-one individually the identity IDu and password pwu. Whereas, other protocols leave the
option of guessing individually the identity and the password. Therefore, our improved version
provides strong credential privacy even in the case of ephemeral leakage without increasing the
computational overheads over the Sureshkumar et al.’s protocol [26] and Zhang et al.’s protocol
[19].
7 Performance analysis
In this section, we discuss the performance comparison as well as the security features satisfied
by various related schemes in the literature.
In Table 2, we compare the computational overheads required in various existing protocols
as well as our improved version of the protocol. To analyze the computational cost, we use the
notations for different cryptographic operations as follows: Tpm : ECC point multiplication and
Th: cryptographic hash function, and we omit the other lightweight operation such as symmetric-
key encryption/decryption and bitwise exclusive-OR operations in our comparison. In order to
Table 2. Computation cost comparison
Scheme
Participant
Total overhead Running Time
User U Server S
Lu et al. [23] 3Tpm+8Th 3Tpm+7Th 6Tpm+15Th 0.1074 sec
Chaudhry et al. [22] 3Tpm+5Th 3Tpm+5Th 6Tpm+10Th 0.1058 sec
Tu et al. [21] 3Tpm+5Th 3Tpm+5Th 6Tpm+10Th 0.1058 sec
Farash [7] 4Tpm+5Th 3Tpm+5Th 7Tpm+10Th 0.1229 sec
Lu et al. [20] 2Tpm+4Th 2Tpm+5Th 4Tpm+9Th 0.07128 sec
Arshad et al. [24] 2Tpm+4Th 2Tpm+4Th 4Tpm+8Th 0.07096 sec
Zhang et al. [19] 3Tpm+4Th 3Tpm+5Th 6Tpm+9Th 0.10548 sec
Sureshkumar et al. [26] 3Tpm+7Th 3Tpm+5Th 6Tpm+12Th 0.10644 sec
Ours 3Tpm+6Th 3Tpm+5Th 6Tpm+11Th 0.10612 sec
estimate the approximate execution timings, we use the experimental results presented in He et
al.’s work [27]. The approximate execution timings are Tpm ≈ 0.0171sec and Th ≈ 0.00032sec.
From the Table 2, it is clear that our proposed improvement requires little lesser computational
cost compared to the original Sureshkumar et al.’s protocol [26], and our improvement is also
comparable with the other existing protocols.
Table 3. Security requirement comparison
Scheme Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10 Z11
Lu et al. [23] N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N
Chaudhry et al. [22] N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Tu et al. [21] N Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y N
Farash [7] N N N Y N N Y Y Y N N
Lu et al. [20] N Y N Y N N Y Y Y Y N
Arshad et al. [24] N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N
Zhang et al. [19] Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N
Sureshkumar et al. [26] Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Ours Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Z1: Achieves user anonymity; Z2: Withstand off-line password guessing attack; Z3: With-
stand impersonation attack; Z4: Withstand insider attack; Z5: Withstand replay attack; Z6:
Achieves strong mutual authentication; Z7: Withstand stolen verifier attack; Z8: Provides ses-
sion key security; Z9: Achieves perfect forward secrecy; Z10: Withstand man-in-the-middle at-
tack; Z11: Whether provide credentials privacy when session ephemeral revealed to an adversary;
Y : Provides the security feature; N : Does not provide the security feature.
In the Table 3, we compare security features satisfied by the various related existing protocols
[23,22,21,7,20,24,19,26] with our improved version of the protocol. We can observe that Lu et
al. [23], Chaudhry et al. [22], Tu et al. [21], Farash [7], Lu et al. [20] and Arshad et al. [24] failed
to provide user anonymity because most of them send his/her username/identity in plaintext to
the server through a public channel or we can compute the identity easily from the transmitted
messages. However, according to our observation, from the Table 3, Lu et al. [23], Tu et al. [21],
Farash [7], Lu et al. [20], Arshad et al. [24] and Zhang et al. [19] schemes fail to resist from replay
attack. Off course we can prevent this attack by properly merging the timestamp in the transmitted
messages. In addition, the impersonation attacks is also a serious concern where Tu et al. [21],
Farash [7], Lu et al. [20],and Zhang et al. [19] fails to provide it. Our improved version of the
protocol provides more security features along with the comparable computational overheads
compared to the other existing schemes in the literature. As a result, our proposed improvement
outperform in terms of computational efficiency along with offers increased security features.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have first analyzed the security limitations of the recently proposed Sureshkumar et al. and
Zhang et al.’s session initiation protocols. We have shown that both the schemes fail to protect the
user secret credentials (identity and password) when the session ephemeral secrets are unexpect-
edly revealed to an adversary by the session exposure attacks. The presented security analysis in
this paper is also applicable to most of the existing schemes in the literature. We then discuss the
possible improvement to overcome the pitfalls find the existing schemes. In addition, we present
the security and performance comparisons of the related existing schemes in the literature and
compare with the proposed enhanced scheme. In our observation, the further study is required in
this area of research to design secure and efficient session initiation protocols for quality health-
care services. In the future work, we aim to explore novel privacy preserving approaches for
session initiation protocol, particular to the emergency healthcare application.
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